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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ATTORNEY GENERAL v. X: A LOST
OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE THE LIMITS
OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992 the Irish Supreme Court decided a case with the
potential to alter the ways in which the Member States of the
European Union (EU) relate to one another, and to the EU
itself. The case, Attorney General v. X,' presented issues about
the proper course of conduct for a Member State when the
national constitution is seen as conflicting with EU law.2 The
Irish Supreme Court was faced with the prospect of declaring
that Irish Constitutional law, specifically the ban on abortion
enshrined in the eighth amendment to the Irish Constitution,'
was incompatible with, and therefore must bow to, the con-
cepts of free movement of persons and the freedom to provide
services which are enshrined in the EU's founding treaties.4
Instead of grappling with this difficult issue, the Irish
Supreme Court, purporting to decide the case on the basis of
national law,5 declared that the constitutional ban on abortion
contains an exception to be used when the life of the mother is
in danger.6 Had the Irish Supreme Court referred questions to
1. Attorney General v. X, [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir. S.C.).
2. The conflict will usually stem, as it did in the X case, from a situation in
which national law constricts the exercise of a right available under EU law.
3. Amend. VIII, Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
4. As will be shown, when a provision of Member State law conflicts with
EU law, the EU law must be given effect. See discussion infra note 37.
5. If the case is decided on the basis of national law, the Irish court would
not be required to look at how EU law would impact the dispute before the court.
This process is similar to when a state court in the U.S. decides an issue on inde-
pendent state law grounds obviating the need to reach the federal issue.
6. See Attorney General, [1992] 1 I.R at 1. The Irish court stated that the
Irish Constitution's ban on abortion contained an exception when the mother's life
is in danger. Here, Ms. X stated that she would kill herself if she was not al-
lowed to receive the abortion. Therefore the court lifted an injunction requested by
the Attorney General and permitted her to travel to London.
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the European Court of Justice (ECJ)7 on the proper interpre-
tation of the Treaty provisions on free movement of persons8
and the freedom to provide services,9 we would undoubtably
now have a better understanding of the nature of EU power.0
An improved understanding of the outer limits of EU power
would, in turn, give the Member States who wish to pass laws
that restrict free movement under the Article 36 public morali-
ty exceptions" some confidence that those laws will withstand
challenge. Finally, an awareness of the limits of European Law
would allow Member States to further strengthen national
protection for the fundamental rights guaranteed in their con-
stitutions.
This potential for conflict between Community law and
Member State law will be this Note's focus. More specifically,
the Note will discuss the possibility of a Member State decid-
ing to review Community action to ensure its correspondence
with the rights and duties created by the Member State consti-
tution.
The Note will begin by analyzing the referral system set
out in the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2 by
7. The referral system established by the EC Treaty is discussed infra Part
III.C. The concepts of freedom of movement for persons and the freedom to pro-
vide services are codified in the EC Treaty at arts. 48-66. See Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Feb. 7; 1992, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC
Treaty].
8. EC Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 48(1).
9. Id. at art. 59.
10. A referral to the ECJ in the X case may have given guidance about the
ways in which the EU was likely to act when new challenges to its power arose
as in the Member States recent decision to sever bi-lateral relations with Austria,
an EU member, when the Freedom Party, under Jorg Haider, was asked to join
the national government.
11. EC Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 36. "The provisions of Articles 30-34 [free
movement of goods] shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports,
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy, or
public security." Id. See also id. at arts. 30-34. A recent example of a nation exer-
cising its article 36 right to restrict goods based on a concern for public health
was the continued French ban on imports of British beef, even though the Euro-
pean Commission had declared that the beef was safe.
12. EC Treaty supra note 7. The EC Treaty was originally named the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community. It was amended by the Single
European Act in 1987, by the Treaty on European Union in 1992 (TEU), and by
the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1998. The most recent attempt to amend the treaty,
with the 2000 talks in Nice appears to have failed with German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroder calling for a "redefinition" of the Franco-German alliance that
has driven the Construction of Europe. See Divorce after all these years? Not quite,
1724 [Vol. XXVI:4
20011 ATTORNEY GENERAL V. X 1725
which a national court which has difficulty in interpreting a
Treaty provision, or is not sure how the Treaty impacts the
case before it, shall refer a question or questions to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice for an opinion as to the proper interpre-
tation of the Treaty. 3 This discussion, and the binding nature
of such opinions, will be informed by a systemic view of EU
decision making.
Next, the ability of a Member State to review Community
action will be analyzed through the prism of the German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court's (GFCC) Maastricht decision;'4 pay-
ing particularly close attention to the German court's analysis
of the democracy principle and the importance of legitimized
decision making on a national and supra-national level. 5 Fi-
nally, the Note will apply the principles of the Maastricht opin-
ion to the Irish Supreme Court's decision in Attorney General
v. X'6 in an effort to understand how a Member State may
but... THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2001, at 49.
The TEU changed the name of the European Economic Community to the
European Community (EC) in an effort to exemplify the increasingly social nature
of European integration. The TEU instituted a pillar structure for the government
of the Union. The EC, along with the European Coal and Steel Community and
Euratom, the European Atomic Commission form one pillar through the article 212
merger of these groups into the European Community. The second pillar of the
EU is the common foreign and security policy adopted by Title V of TEU. The
third and final pillar is cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, estab-
lished by Title VI of TEU. Since the TEU was subsumed within the EC Treaty,
all citatins to TEU treaty sections will be made to the EC Treaty.
13. See EC Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 177. Though the EC is just one part
of the pillar structure established by TEU, it is the only one that concerns this
note. The law making institutions of the EU, the Council of Ministers, the Europe-
an Commission, and the European Parliament, may only act in a binding way on
the Member States when that action is taken pursuant to a power contained with-
in the EC Treaty. Community instructions on the common foreign and security
policy and the cooperation of justice and home affairs for example, are advisory
only.
14. Federal Constitutional Court Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty,
33 I.L.M. 388, 444 (BVerfG 1994).
15. With its decision in this case, the GFCC demonstrates the democratic
illegitimacy of the EU while also pointing out the inherent problems of any action
derived from either the implied powers doctrine or an EU commerce clause. See
id. The GFCC also places itself between the Commission and the ECJ when it
determines the compatibility of EU legislation with the democracy principle en-
shrined in the Basic Law. See id. Note that the requirement of democratic legiti-
macy becomes increasingly important in the context of the European Monetary
Union, the completion of which will remove the last major barrier to the complete
unification of Europe.
16. Attorney General v. X, [19921 1 I.R. 1 (Ir. S.C.).
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safeguard its own constitutional rights and obligations in the
face of conflicting Community law.17
The Note will conclude that the GFCC and the Irish Su-
preme Court have established a method by which national
courts, worried about the lack of fundamental rights protection
in the EU, can decide that a national law, potentially in con-
flict with a provision of the Treaty, nonetheless applies.
II. HISTORY OF POST WORLD WAR II EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
In the wake of the social dislocation and economic devasta-
tion caused by the Second World War, the nations of Europe
began looking at different ways through which they could se-
cure a peaceful, prosperous future. Beginning with the creation
of the Benelux Union, s and the European Coal and Steel
Community, 9 the economic integration of Europe was seen as
the best means of limiting the regional and national rivalries
that engulfed the continent twice in the first half of the twenti-
eth century.0 In 1957, the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community (EEC) was signed in Rome,2 its re-
17. The recent furor over the Freedom Party's ascension into power in Austria
demonstrates that something as essential to a free and democratic society as the
outcome of its own elections could potentially be a part of national sovereignty
surrendered to the EU. Many Member States may object to such an intrusion
leading to a new round of debate over the future of the European Union, a debate
this author suggests is long overdue.
18. Treaty Instituting the Benelux Union, Feb. 3, 1958, 381 U.N.T.S. 260
(entered into force Nov. 1, 1960).
19. "An admirable example of co-operation and a practical application of the
call for peace is the European Coal and Steel Community built on the premise
that, if the basic raw materials for war (coal and steel) are removed from national
control, wars between the traditional enemies, France and Germany, will become
virtually impossible as long as both are prevented from developing a substantial
war industry." D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 4 (5th ed., 1991). See also Treaty Establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty].
20. See LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 19. See also id. at 5, stating that the
presence of two competing super-powers acted as an impetus towards European
integration which was seen as a means of restoring Europe's self-respect. It also
seems to have worked: One superpower has fallen, and although another lurks
ready to take its place, the EU is now the world's largest trade area with one of
the strongest economies in the world.
21. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. After Maastricht, the name of this treaty was changed to
the Treaty Establishing the European Community in an effort to reflect the chang-
ing nature of the motivation behind the integration of Europe. See discussion su-
pra note 12.
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sounding success at achieving its objectives of "[promoting] ...
an increase in stability... and closer relations among those
nations belonging to [the treaty]"2 2 was so complete that in
the forty years the EEC has been in existence its membership
has grown from six to fifteen and it has plans to expand to
nearly twice that number in the coming years.'
However, integration has not come without its price. There
are many within the Community who feel that national identi-
ty is being sacrificed in the name of economic stability; and
that this is a price they are unwilling to pay.' This conflict
between a desire to retain a national identity and a concomi-
tant desire to continue on the road to integration, is being
played out every day in each of the nations that make up the
Community.' This conflict is especially important in coun-
tries where the national identity is tied to the protection of
rights which may conflict with the EU's goal of ever closer
cooperation and integration among, and between, the Member
States.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION
Originally created as a customs union, the European Com-
munity has grown into a political and legal community the
likes of which the world has never seen.26 In an early opinion
that demonstrated an expansive view of Community power, the
ECJ said that the Treaty Establishing the European Commu-
nity created a "new legal order of international law."27 This
22. EC Treaty, supra note 7.
23. The EEC was originally made up of the Benelux countries (Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg), France, Italy, and Germany. On Jan. 1, 1973,
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom ascended into the EEC. In the 1980s,
Greece, Spain, and Portugal joined, with the final three members; Austria, Nor-
way, and Sweden who joined in the 1990's. Membership is expected to grow rapid-
ly in the coming years as many of the former communist bloc nations of Eastern
Europe are hoping to gain admission. See Permanent Revolution for Europe's Un-
ion?, THE ECONOMIST Feb. 3-9, 2001, at 49.
24. Evidence of public dissatisfaction with the EU has taken many forms.
Among them are the British and Danish refusal to join the European Monetary
Union and the European Currency Unit and the recent gathering of signatures for
an Austrian referendum on whether that State should discontinue its membership.
See, e.g., World Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at A8; EU 14 Give Way to
Austria, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 16, 2000, at 59.
25. See Permanent Revolution, supra note 23.
26. See discussion supra note 12.
27. Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-En Expedire Ouderneming van Gend
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new order has been especially difficult for scholars to under-
stand since both the structure of the EU and the power that it
wields, are in a constant state of flux.' One scholar, David
Gerber, has said that the reason that so many American, and
some European, commentators have difficulty contending with
the EU is that they are attempting to apply U.S. legal methods
in the EU context and that this will, almost inherently, lead to
inaccurate results.29
Gerber states that these inaccurate results are bound to
occur because commentators do not grasp that there are real
and fundamental differences that underlie the decision making
processes in the U.S. and the EU. 0 For example, decisions of
the European Court of Justice are less important for their
"holding" than for the value judgments that underlie the
Court's reasoning.3' These value judgements, chief among
them the need to foster economic and political integration, are
then used as authoritative principles to guide judicial and
administrative decision makers. What makes U.S. observance
of the importance of these value judgments difficult is that
they represent a "cultural" or community-based pattern of
thought and action." However, there is "little historical expe-
en Los v. Nederlande Tariefcommissie, 1963 E.C.R. 1 (1967) [hereinafter van
Gend en Los].
28. For example the TEU changed the legislative procedures of the Commu-
nity by increasing the use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers
and strengthening the co-decision role of the European Parliament. See also James
Henry Bergeron, An Ever Whiter Myth: The Colonization of Modernity in European
Community Law, in EUROPE'S OTHER: EUROPEAN LAW BETWEEN MODERNITY AND
POST-MODERNITY 7 (Peter Fitzpatrick & James Henry Bergeron, eds., 1998). Pro-
fessor Bergeron argues that the jurisprudence of the ECJ has created a theory of
progression as a fundamental starting point for thinking about Community law,
"the Treaties themselves do not establish a static legal order complete from the
outset but a legislative process reflecting the nature of the Community as a grqdu-
ally evolving legal system, the progressive realization of which entails the progres-
sive surrender of rights by the states." Id. at 14-15.
29. See David J. Gerber, Dimensions of European Law: A Symposium, 1
COLUM J. EuR. L. 379 (1995).
30. Id. See also Bergeron, supra note 28, at 9-10. Bergeron argues that the
goal of the ECJ, and therefore a principle that underlies all of its decisions is the
creation of an individual of the treaties, whose rights are not limited by the
bounds of national society. Id. at 10.
31. Gerber, supra note 29.
32. The community-based patterns of thought in this context are clearly the
completion of the internal market and the increasingly close cooperation in non-
economic spheres of government. EU competition policy is a clear example of the
importance of the goals of the community overriding generally established (at least
1728
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rience associating community-based patterns of thought and
action with supra-national groups."33
Instead, Gerber argues that we should adopt a systemic
view of the EU. Such a view would show the EU as a system of
interaction among texts, institutions, communities of decision
makers, and ways of thinking.34 When analyzing an EU text,
such as an ECJ opinion, under the systemic view, one must
attempt to relate that text to other intellectual, political, and
social influences by asking who interprets the text, for what
purpose, and in what context. For example, in the Cassis de
Dijon35 case, the Court of Justice expanded the article 36 re-
strictions to cover consumer protection, largely as a result of
local concerns and public pressures in the Member States dur-
ing the early 1970's."6
The current legal and political status of the European
Union is not only troublesome for scholars, but also for those
that created it. Conflict exists, even among the Member States
of the European Community, as to whether this "new legal
order" has progressed to become a federation of states or re-
mains merely a supra-national organization geared toward the
economic benefit of its members. 7 Thiuncertain status of the
in the United States) rules of law.
33. Gerber, supra note 27.
34. Id. See also, William J. Davey, European Integration: Reflections on its
Limits and Effects, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 185, 186 (1993). Davey de-
scribes the European Union system of governance as a system of concentric circles.
35. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopol-Verwaltung Fur Brantwein, case
120/78, 11979] ECR 649 (Cassis de Dijon). The court held "obstacles to move-
ment . . . resulting from disparities between the national laws ... must be ac-
cepted . . . as being necessary [in] the defense of the consumer." Id. at para. 9.
36. GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, ELEANOR M.
Fox, CASES AND MATERiALs ON EUROPEAN COMMuNTrY LAW 353 (1993).
37. Whatever appellation is given to the European Community, it is clear that
the EC wields considerable power over the economies of Europe. Indeed the stated
goal of the EC treaty was to create a "common market and an economic and mon-
etary union" partially through "an internal market characterized by the abolition,
as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital." See EC Treaty supra note 7, at arts. 2, 3(c). In order to gain
the economic benefits of Community membership the various Member States have
chosen to refrain from exercising their sovereign rights by affirmatively granting
the Community competency to make law in certain areas. See e.g., Pigs Marketing
Board, Case C-83178 (holding that once the community has pursuant to a Treaty
provision legislated for the common organization of the market in a given sector,
Member States are under an obligation to refrain from taking any measure which
might undermine or create exceptions to it). What is also clear is that within
these spheres of Union competence, Union law is supreme over any conflicting
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EU was magnified in 200 when the member states sought to
impose sanctions on Austria as punishment for the gains
achieved in recent elections by the Freedom Party.38 This
move, particularly disingenuous if one looks at some of the
past governments of certain EU states, especially France and
Italy, perhaps tips the EU's hand that the Member States are
taking the plunge toward federalism.
A. Authority for EU Decision Making
The EU must be classified as a sovereign entity. In its
areas of competence it has complete authority to legislate, and
its acts are binding on the Member States. 9 Additionally,
Member State citizens are able to assert claims based on EU
law against national governments.4" Finally, the EU repre-
sents itself, and therefore the Member States at various inter-
national conferences.4
The EU, similar to the U.S. federal government, is a gov-
ernment of limited, enumerated powers, able to take only those
actions over which the sovereign constituents have agreed to
limit the exercise of their individual rights for the good of the
whole.42 However, even though the actual treaty language
Member State law. Compare the German Federal Constitutional Court's Maastricht
decision, supra note 14; Steve J. Boom, The European Union After the Maastricht
Decision: Will Germany be the "Virginia of Europe?" 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 177
(1995), with van Gend en Loos, supra note 27 (establishing the ECJ as the sole
interpreter of EC law), and case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
38. Perhaps as a result of those sanctions the Freedom Party has lost most of
the ground that it gained in 2000, garnering less than half the votes in previously
received in the most recent elections. See Dangerous in the Extreme: Recent Poor
Election Results are Forcing Europe's Far Right Parties to Moderate their Rhetoric
but the Threat to Democracy Still Remains, THE GuARDIAN (LONDON), Oct. 18,
2000, at 21.
39. See van Gend en Loos, supra note 27, and Pigs Marketing Board, supra
note 37.
40. See BERMANN, ET AL., supra note 36, at 181 (stating that when a Commu-
nity law rule has direct effect-meaning that it creates rights for private parties
and not merely obligations for Member States-private parties may bring an ac-
tion against a Member State, or another private party, to enforce those rights).
41. See van Gend en Loos, supra note 76 (holding that EU law has direct
effect within the Member States partially by the establishment of community insti-
tutions which are endowed with sovereign rights).
42. Who the sovereign constituents actually are is a matter of some debate.
The Treaties themselves are signed by the member states, as states and not as
representatives of their citizenry. But see BERGERON, supra note 28 (arguing that
the ECJ has interpreted the Treaties so that the individuals that comprise the
1730 [Vol. XXV:4
2001] ATTORNEY GENERAL V. X 1731
may appear limiting, 3 it has been interpreted quite broadly
by the European Commission" and the European Court of
Justice5 in an effort to expand the scope of Community au-
thority.
Prior to the Treaty on European Union," if the Commu-
nity wished to legislate in an area that was not strictly con-
cerned with the formation or strengthening of the economic
community,47 it was forced to attempt to link that legislation
with the Member States' economic integration.48 However,
this limitation proved to be more theoretical than real since "it
appears that virtually any measure likely to advance the com-
mon market, promote the convergence of Member State eco-
nomic policies, or simply enhance economic performance within
the Community would respond to a legitimate Community pur-
pose."49 It thus appears that the European Community was
able to exercise power in much the same way as the United
States Congress was allowed to legislate on matters of local
concern through the use of the Commerce Clause; ° before the
Member States are the true constituents of the EU).
43. The Treaties contain affirmative grants of power, any power not contained
spelled out was presumably left to the Member States. The principle of
subsidiarity, contained in TEU, art. 3b, is the latest attempt to limit expansive
EU power. "The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred
upon it by the Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein . . . " EC Trea-
ty, supra note 7, art. 3b.
44. The European Commission is commonly referred to as the EU's executive
branch. The Commission is responsible for initiating all legislation and also en-
sures that the other institutions, the Member States, and EU business entities
comply with the law. The Commission is appointed to a renewable four-year term
by the Member States and its deliberations are secret. See BERMANN, ET AL., su-
pra note 36, at 57.
45. See EC Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 164-188.
46. The Treaty on European Union was signed at Maastricht on February 7,
1992 and came into effect on November 1, 1993. See Treaty on European Union,
O.J. C 224/1 (1992). There was considerable public discomfort with some of the
Treaty's provisions, especially those that expanded the scope of Union competency
through the establishment of economic and monetary union and the creation of a
common currency. See id., art. A.
47. The scope of community authority under arts. 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty.
48. See BERMAANN, ET AL., supra note 36, at 29. See also Konstantinos D.
Kerameus, Political Integration and Procedural Convergence in the EU, 45 AM.
JU. CoMP. L. 919 (1997). Kerameus states that after the SEA both the required
degree of connection between the subject matter of the laws to be approximated
and the integrated market has been loosened. Id.
49. BERNANN, ET AL., supra note 36, at 30.
50. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 3.
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landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court in U.S.
v. Lopez.5 Contrary to what has happened recently in the
U.S., the EC was aided by the Court of Justice in its exercise
of "commerce power."
The Court of Justice, therefore, can be said to have accel-
erated the process of European integration through its expan-
sive reading of the founding treaties 2 and the Community's
ability to legislate under them. For instance, the Court has
declared that Union law is supreme over national law, even
though the treaties themselves do not contain a supremacy
clause." The Court has also read the treaties so that they
contain a doctrine of implied powers54 similar to that found in
the United States Constitution by Chief Justice John Marshall
in McCulloch v. Maryland.55 The doctrine of implied powers,
51. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Supreme Court, for the
first time in more than fifty years found that an act of Congress was unconstitu-
tional because it exceeded that body's authority under the Commerce Clause. See
id. See also U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 3.
52. The European Union was founded (as the EEC) by the Treaty of Rome in
1957. See supra note 14. That treaty has been amended by the Single European
Act, The Maasrticht Treaty (the Treaty on European Union) and most recently by
the Treaty of Amsterdam. Collectively these are know as the founding treaties.
53. Pigs Marketing Board, supra note 37. The supremacy of Community law
stems from the idea of the common internal market. If the nations of the Commu-
nity have chosen to come together to limit the exercise of their sovereignty, in
order to gain the benefits of the common market, then the rules that govern the
completion of that market must control over any other conflicting laws.
54. Article 235 of the EC Treaty contains an implied powers provision. It
states:
"[i]f action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of
the Community and th[e] Treaty has not provided the necessary powers,
the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission
and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate mea-
sures."
EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 235. However, the cases that have upheld the
Community's use of implied powers have not relied on this treaty provision. See
e.g., Case 8/55, Federation Charbonniere de Belgique v. High Authority
(Federchar), 1954 ECR 245 (1954-56) (holding that the ECSC Treaty granted the
High Authority certain independence necessary for the attainment of the objectives
referred to in the Treaty. This independence did not stem from ECSC Treaty, art.
95 (the implied powers article) but rather from the substantive Community power
at issue in the case). See also Cases 281, 283-85, 287/85, Germany v. Commission
(Immigration of non-Community workers), 1987 ECR 2303 (1987) (holding that
when an article of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
here art. 118, confers on the Commission a specific task, it necessarily confers the
powers which are indispensable in order to carry out that task).
55. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 408 (1819). Marshall,
1732
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along with the attempt to link Community action with econom-
ic integration, were the two key avenues for the consolidation
of power during the early years of the Community.
One needs to view this increase in Community power in
light of the political and social elements of the day. During the
1950's, post-war economic expansion provided a climate in
which the Community's ambitions proved palatable to the
Member State governments and, therefore, the ECJ's expan-
sive reading of the Treaty and the Community's powers under
it, especially the implied powers doctrine, received little atten-
tion.5" The mid-1980's was another period of widespread polit-
ical support for integration as evidenced by the 1985 White
Paper on "Completing the Internal Market" 7 and the rati-
fication of the 1987 Single European Act (SEA).58
These documents, along with TEU and the formation of
the European Monetary Union (EMU), shifted the EC's institu-
tional balance away from inter-governmental cooperation and
toward supra-nationalism by transferring new competencies to
the Community.59 The Treaty on European Union," signed
at Maastricht in 1992, granted the Community unprecedented
control over the internal workings of the Member States there-
by codifying and legitimizing the expansive view of Community
power.
The TEU changed the name of the Community from the
European Economic Community to the European Communi-
ty6' demonstrating the increasingly social and cultural nature
of the integration of Europe. The TEU also instituted citizen-
reading the constitution as a whole stated that "it may with great reason be con-
tended, that a government, entrusted with such ample powers, on the due execu-
tion of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must
also be entrusted with ample means for their execution." Id.
56. See Nicolai Ronnebek Hinrichsen, The Constitutional Challenge to Europe-
an Union Membership: A Challenge to the Danish Supreme Court, 15 B.U. INTL
L.J. 571, 576 (1997).
57. See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to
the European Council, COM(85)310.
58. Single European Act, 1987 O.L.J. (L 169).
59. See Hinrichsen, supra note 55, at 576.
60. See EC Treaty, supra note 6.
61. Id. at art. 1. TEU also increased the use of qualified majority voting in
the Council of Ministers thereby eliminating the power of a Member State to have
its own way by dragging its feet and preventing unanimity.
2001] 1733
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ship of the political Union,62 stating that "every person hold-
ing the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the
Union." 's Additionally, the TEU continued the trend of grant-
ing new competencies to the Union, by including an explicit
authorization to act in areas of education, public health, and
vocational training." Finally, the TEU seeks to give the Un-
ion the opportunity to "contribute to the flowering of the cul-
tures of the Member States.'
Therefore, during the above time periods, when we ask
who interprets the law, for what purpose, and in what context,
it becomes easier to understand why the Court of Justice and
the other Community institutions have exercised such broad
powers. The current status of Community power is slightly less
certain.
B. Challenges to EU Authority
The large grants of power contained in TEU have caused
ripples of discomfort to flow through some Member States."6
There is a fear that nameless, faceless Eurocrats, who are not
at all responsible to the citizens of the Member States,67 are
controlling too many aspects of daily life within each state.68
This so-called "democracy deficit"69 has led Member states
62. See EC Treaty, supra note 7, at arts. 8-8e.
63. Id., art. 8.
64. Hinrichsen, supra note 56, at 576. See also TEU, supra note 46, at arts.
J-I.
65. EC Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 128.
66. A poll reprinted in the Economist found that 57% of British voters were
against UK membership in the EMU. This may prove disastrous as Prime Minis-
ter Tony Blair has said that British membership in the monetary union will be
decided by a public referendum. See THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 1999, at 12-13.
67. Recall that members of the European Commission are appointed by the
Member State governments and meet in secret. The Council of Ministers, the EU
legislative branch, consists of the representative from each Member State who
works in whatever area the Council is debating. If the Council is discussing Com-
munity transportation policy, then the Ministers of Transportation of the various
Member States will be the ones in attendance. The European Parliament, the only
democratically elected part of the EU government has historically been the weak-
est. Only recently has the Parliament been given increased powers of co-decision.
See EC Treaty, supra note 7, at arts. 145-54.
68. See Europe's Mid-Life Crisis, a Survey of the European Union, THE ECON-
OMIST, May 31, 1997, at 15-16 (stating that the gap between the "bureaucrat in
Brussels" and the man on the street is widening, and suggesting that Europeans
would react more favorably to the EU if its institutions were more democratic).
69. The democracy deficit expresses itself in situations where an unelected
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and their citizens to challenge the legitimacy of Community
action that relies on implied powers granted to the Commu-
nity, not by the Member States, but by the Court of Justice.7 °
This type of discomfort has expressed itself at numerous
times throughout the EU's history. In the 1960's, President
Charles DeGaulle of France, whose vision of Europe as a "Eu-
rope de Patries" suggests inter-governmental cooperation be-
tween sovereigns, rather than a supra-national structure, dom-
inated the EC and successfully blocked British accession in
both 1961 and 1967.7"
Additionally, economic factors limited the enthusiasm of
EC advocates through the 1970's and into the 1980's. The 1973
oil crisis crushed their early optimism, and the resulting infla-
tion and unemployment made supra-national economic regula-
tion an unwelcome idea to many. 2 Finally, the late 1980's
and early 90's have seen the principle of subsidiarity arise as
an internal challenge to the increased integration envisioned
by the TEU.73
The subsidiarity principle, introduced in the SEA 4 and
later included in TEU, states that "the community shall act
within the limits of the powers conferred by [the] Treaty."75
member of a national government binds that nation's citizens to a particular
course of action through his vote in the Council of Ministers. This vote will create
obligations, and grant rights, to national citizens without their express consent. A
national citizen who disagrees with this decision, or who feels that he is harmed
by it as little recourse.
70. As a result of this distrust of EU power grabbing opinion polls in Austria
and Sweeden suggest that a majority of voters in those countries would now vote
against EU membership. See Europe's Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 68. Other exam-
ples of dissatisfaction with EU policy are; the Danish rejection of the Maastricht
treaty, its narrow approval in the French referendum, and the two votes against
EU membership by Norway. Presumably the use of implied powers based on Arti-
cle 235 would be immune to such criticism since that provision requires unanimity
in the Council. However, Article 235's requirement that Parliament only be con-
sulted weakens the legitimacy of actions taken under it.
71. Hinrichsen, supra note 56, at 577.
72. Davey, supra note 34, at 89.
73. There is also some fear that the next Treaty, which some had hoped
would be ready for signature as early as Dec. 2000, will increase the use of quali-
fied majority voting in the Council and thus widen the democracy deficit. However,
this may be offset by a reallocation of Commissioners through which the larger
states, such as Germany, may gain votes and decrease the level of over represen-
tation of the smaller states, such as Luxembourg. See THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 13,
1999, at 51-52. But see Divorce After All These Years?, supra note 12.
74. Single European Act, supra note 9.
75. EC Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 3(b). The TEU also states "[tihis Treaty
BROOK. J. INTL L.
The treaty goes on to say that unless the action is within an
area of exclusive Community competency, the Community will
act only if the results of the proposed action cannot be "suffi-
ciently achieved" by the Member States.76 While subsidiarity
may thus seem an attempt on the part of the Member States
to limit the Community's use of the implied powers doctrine,77
an equally valid argument can be made that subsidiarity is
supportive of integration in that it reinforces the supremacy of
Community action in its seemingly ever increasing areas of
competence.78 Whether it is seen as supporting integration, or
as reserving power in the Member States, subsidiarity is now a
fundamental aspect of EU law-making as evidenced by all
three of the law making institutions of the Community having
created procedures to ensure compliance with the subsidiarity
principle.79
Ensuring compliance with subsidiarity is one way that
Member States, through their representatives in the Council of
Ministers, can ensure that the community does not attempt to
exercise power outside the range of its competencies. Addition-
ally, there have been situations where political will and public
pressure have trumped doctrine in determining the result of a
conflict.8" However, a Member State may find itself outnum-
bered in the Council and unable to garner wide public support.
marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citi-
zen." TEU, supra note 46, at art. A.
76. EC Treaty, supra note 7, at art 3b.
77. See generally, George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federal-
ism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332
(1994). Berman argues that the aim of subsidiarity is not localism, but rather the
pursuit of such values as self-determination and accountability and the preserva-
tion of identities. See id. at 340-41. See also, Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legiti-
macy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalsim: The Example of the
European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 668-69 (1999).
78. Subsidiarity may cause the institutions of the Community to rely more on
Article 235, thus removing most claims that the Community's actions are ultra
vires.
79. See Christian Timmermans, Subsidiarity and Transparency, 22 FORDHAM
INTL L. J. 106, 108 (1999). One area that may not see the effects of subsidiarity
is the European Monetary Union. The way the EMU is set up, with complete
independence from the other institutions of the EC, as well as independence for
the Member State banks, leads one to believe that the goal is to have monetary
decisions made as far as possible from the citizen, rather than as close as possible
to him which is the goal of subsidiarity.
80. See e.g., Cassis de Dijon supra note 35.
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What can that nation do to ensure that a right it considers
fundamental, although others may disagree as to its impor-
tance, is protected? One way that rights are traditionally pro-
tected in the U.S. is through the court system. In the EU con-
text, the question becomes who does the reviewing, and of
what law?
C. Judicial Review of Community Action
The Court of Justice has held that Member States may not
review directives and regulations in order to determine their
constitutionality under principles of national law."' Instead,
the national court shall refer the matter to the Court of Justice
for a binding interpretation of the Treaty provision at issue. 2
The referral system was included in the Treaty in order to
increase the process of centralized decision making and to rein-
force the notion that Community law is above and beyond
national law." The notion that EU law is in some way superi-
or to national law stems from article 5 of the Treaty, which
imposes a constitutional obligation on national courts to give
full effect to Community law" and from ECJ decisions inter-
81. Case 314/85, Firma Fot-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lubeck-Ost, 1987 ECR
4199 (1987). Article 189 of EC Treaty sets out the mechanisms through which the
institutions of the EU make law. It states in pertinent part: "[in order to carry
out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, the European
Parliament acting jointly with the Council, the Council and the Commission shall
make regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations or
deliver opinions. EC Treaty, art. 189. From the point of view of harmonization, a
regulation is the strongest weapon in the Community arsenal, it has general appli-
cation and is directly and entirely applicable in each Member State. Id. A direc-
tive, on the other hand, is only binding as to the result achieved; the Member
States are allowed to choose the form and methods of implementation. Id. Deci-
sions are binding upon the parties to which they are issued, and recommendations
and opinions are advisory only and have no binding force. Id.
82. Article 177 says that the court of justice shall have the authority to give
preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the treaty. EC Treaty, supra
note 7, at art. 177(a). See also id., art. 173 which states that the ECJ shall re-
view the legality of acts . . . intended to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third par-
ties. Id. at art. 173.
83. The idea that community law is superior to national law has been given
effect by the ECJ and has not been challenged by the Member States. See e.g.,
van (lend en Loos, supra note 27; Pigs Marketing Board, supra note 37.
84. Article 5 of the EC treaty says "Member States shall take all appropriate
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations
arising out of th[e] Treaty or resulting from actions taken by the institutions of
the Community they shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks."
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preting the Treaty so that EU law is directly effective and
superior to national law. 5
The Court of Justice has also held that when a Member
State enacts legislation to implement a Community directive,
that legislation also must be interpreted in the light of the
founding treaties and the principles that underlie them. 6 The
primacy of Union law thus applies to national law-making in-
stitutions such as administrative agencies, courts, and legisla-
tures.17 Indeed, in order to give full effect to EU law, an ad-
ministrative agency may be forced to either ignore or go be-
yond national law, or abstain from action.8
The system of government that has been set up by the
founding treaties is necessarily a power sharing system,89
since the Community lacks true coercive power over the Mem-
ber States.90 Therefore, the EU must rely on the Member
See EC Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 5. See also Case C-213/89, The Queen v.
Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factorame Ltd., 1990 E.C.R. 1-2433
[1990], at para. 19 (stating that pursuant to ECJ precedent, national courts are
under an article 5 obligation to ensure the legal protection of persons that derive
from the direct effect of certain provisions of Community law); Kurt Riechenberg,
Local Administration and the Binding Nature of Community Directives, 22
FORDHAM INTL. L. J. 696, 704 (1999). The Court of Justice has gone so far as to
say that member states must pay damages for losses incurred as a result of a
breach of community law. The member state must pay if the community provision;
involves the grant of a right to individuals, if it identifies the contents of those
rights, and there must be a causal link between the breach of the provision and
the harm suffered. Id.
85. See van Gend en Loos, supra note 27 (applying a test to determine wheth-
er a particular community law is directly effective); Pigs Marketing Board, supra
note 37 (holding that EU law is superior to conflicting national law).
86. The importance of fundamental principles in interpreting treaty provisions
is an example of Gerber's systemic view of the EU. See Gerber, supra note 29. See
also Riechenberg, supra note 84, at 715 (stating "if a national court is called upon
to rule on the legality of such national implementing measures, then it must take
into consideration Community law that forms the legal basis for such measures
and determines the results to be achieved). Id.
87. Riechenberg, supra note 84, at 699.
88. Id.
89. "[The EC has become something more than the original international
economic organization. A separate legal system intertwined with the legal systems
of Member States has been developing through dynamic and synergistic relation-
ships with courts in the Member States. EU law exists at the level of this interac-
tion between domestic and supranational law." Sean C. Monaghan, Europan Union
Legal Personality Disorder: The Union's Legal Nature Through the Prism of the
German Federal Constitutional Court's Maastricht Decision, 12 EMORY INTL L.
REV. 1443, 1465 (1998).
90. The EU does not have its own army or police force. Until recently if a
Member State simply refused to follow Community law there was not much that
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States to enforce Community law, both through statutory en-
actments9 and judicial decision making.2 Community law,
once effective within the Member State, either directly, or after
the passage of national implementing legislation, creates rights
and obligations for national citizens, both individual and corpo-
rate.9" Therefore, an individual who wishes to enforce either a
right or duty under the Treaty usually will bring suit in his
national court." If the national court feels that an issue of
Community law is essential to the resolution of the claim be-
fore it, and the court is unsure of the proper interpretation of
that law, it may refer the question, or a list of questions, to the
European Court of Justice for a binding interpretation of Com-
munity law.
95
the Community could do, either in retaliation, or as enforcement. However, with
the introduction of sanctioning power in art of TEU, the EU now possesses some
coercive power. The Austria case is illustrative. While the fourteen other member
states refrained from bi-lateral contacts, Austria was included in EU decisions.
Indeed since certain EU decisions require unanimous votes of the Member States
Austria's potential veto power could have served as an impetus for the removal of
sanctions three months before the Nice Conference. But see the French refusal to
import British beef, discussed supra note 11. See also EC Treaty, supra note 7, at
art. 85 (giving the Commission sanctioning power over an undertaking that is in
violation of EC competition law).
91. Community directives require implementing legislation at the national
level.
92. Since there are no EU trial courts, Union law must be enforced in suits
brought in national courts. For example Irish law dictates that after the date
upon which a regulation enters into force, it immediately penetrates the Irish legal
order and is, thus, part of Irish law. Therefore, a Irish citizen is able to bring suit
in an Irish national court to enforce an EU law obligation against another Irish
citizen or against the Irish government. See Hugh O'Flaherty, An Introduction to
the Relationship Between European Community Law and National Law in Ireland,
20 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1151, 1164-65 (1997).
93. In van Gend en Loos, supra note 27, the ECJ stated 'to ascertain whether
the provisions of an international treaty extend so far in their effects [so as to be
directly effective] it is necessary to consider the spirit, the general scheme and the
wording of the provisions." Id. at part B. Viewing the Treaty in a systemic way,
reading the Treaty's stated objectives through the prism of the Preamble and the
structure of the Community, the Court held that whether a treaty provision has
direct effect turns on whether it is clear and unconditional or instead requires
legislative intervention by the states. Id. The same test should hold for regulations
issued pursuant to article 189 of the Treaty. See also O'Flaherty, supra note 92.
94. See EC Treaty, supra note 7, at art.173 (outlining the limited situations in
which an EU citizen is able to bring a case directly before the ECJ).
95. See EC Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 177 (describing the referral proce-
dures). When the ECJ answers a referral it is only deciding the proper interpreta-
tion it is not deciding the case for the national court. Instead the national court
will use the ECJ's interpretation in order to resolve the dispute before it.
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Article 177 of the Treaty, which gives the Court of Justice
jurisdiction to give such preliminary rulings, provides that
where the interpretation of Community law is necessary to
resolve a dispute before a national court of last resort, that
court "shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice."96 In
certain limited situations, described in article 173, an individu-
al,"' a Member State,98 or a Community institution," may
bring an action directly before the Court of Justice in order to
challenge the validity of a piece of secondary Community legis-
lation either within two months of the publication of the mea-
sure, or of the date that the plaintiff became aware of the
measure.
100
In sum, the founding treaties, as interpreted by the Court
of Justice, do not provide for Member State review of a particu-
lar Community act, whether a treaty provision or a piece of
secondary legislation. In both cases the Member State court is
required to refer a question, or list of questions, to the Court of
Justice for a determination of Community law. Thus, a Mem-
ber State that feels that either a treaty provision, or a piece of
secondary legislation, conflicts with some fundamental right or
constitutional obligation enshrined in the national law has no
recourse but to pursue their claim before the ECJ.
D. Fundamental Principles
Viewing the history of European integration with an eye
toward "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" it
is easy to understand the principles that underlie the referral
system. In order to avoid different interpretations of the Trea-
ty, it is essential to have one judicial body with complete, and
96. Id.
97. An individual may bring an action before the Court of Justice challenging
the legality of Community action provided that action is of direct and individual
concern to that individual. See id at art. 173.
98. A Member state may bring an action challenging the legality of Communi-
ty action before the Court of Justice on the grounds that; the Community lacks
the competence to take such action, that the action infringes on an essential Com-
munity procedural requirement, that the action infringes upon the TEU itself, or
that the action is violative of "any rule of law related to (the Treaty's) application,
or misuse of powers." Id.
99. Both the Council of Ministers and the Commission are empowered to
bring an action on the same grounds as a Member State. See EC Treaty, supra
note 7, at art. 173.100. Id.
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enforceable, interpretive authority. Additionally, when the
political will of the Member States was not strong enough to
continue the push toward integration, the Court ensured that
the rules providing for integration were enforced.' °' Likewise,
if it is true that "law is as much a part of the national culture
as art or music"10 2 then a supra-national community, which is
striving to create a supra-national culture, indeed a supra-
national person, must have a supra-national system of law.
IV. THE GERMAN CHALLENGE TO COMMUNITY POWER
A. Introduction
It seems clear that Community action that is not grounded
in a Treaty provision..3 is incapable of superceding national
law, since it is in a sense, unconstitutional.' The more diffi-
cult question is: Who gets to implement this principle? 5
While national courts are not given the authority to declare
that a community act is "unconstitutional,"' they do have a
101. See William J. Davey, European Integration: Reflections on its Limits and
Effects, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 185, 200 (1993). Davey states that the ECJ
has played a critical role in the integration process by establishing the right of
individuals to invoke Community law in national courts, the supremacy of Commu-
nity law over national rules, and striking down disguised barriers to trade. Id. See
also Bergeron, supra note 27 (discussing the philosophy of the ECJ as geared
towards increasing integration of the Member States); and discussion supra, notes
43-50 and accompanying text (noting the ECJ's use of the implied powers doctrine
to justify a particular Community act as geared towards completion of the internal
market).
102. David A. 0. Edward, What Kind of Law Does Europe Need? The Role of
Law, Lawyers and Judges in Contemporary European Integration, 5 COLUM. J.
EuR. L. 1 (1998-99) (the author is a judge of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities). See also Bergeron, supra note 28 (arguing that the creation of a
Community individual, untrammeled by the boundaries of Member State citizen-
ship was an early goal of the ECJ and essential for the progression of the Com-
munity to its present state).
103. Such an action would be ultra vires. An act that is ultra vires is one that
is performed without any authority to act on the subject. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1522 (6th ed. 1990).
104. Recall that the EU, under the EC Treaty, is only capable of acting within
the competencies granted it by the Member States. See EC Treaty, supra note 7,
at arts. 1-8.
105. See Dieter Grimm, The European Court of Justice and National Courts:
The German Constitutional Perspective after the Maastricht Decision, 3 COLUM. J.
EuR. L. 229, 232 (1997).
106. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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large role to play in the enforcement of Community law.' °
How far this role extends is an issue that has troubled the
GFCC at least since the 1974 decision commonly referred to as
Solange I.V ' In that case, as well as in Solange II,"09 and
the Maasticht ° decision, the GFCC assumed that it had the
authority to review Community legislation to ensure its com-
patibility with the Basic Law."'
B. German Precedent
In Solange I, the GFCC hued to the widely held view that
Community law forms an independent system of law that flows
from an autonomous legal source."' The court examined
Germany's membership in the Community as flowing from
article 24". of the Basic Law and declared that since the in-
107. See id. See also Riechenberg, supra note 84.
108. Solange means "as long as" and refers to the first word of the opinion.
See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-Und Vorratsstelle Fur
Getreide Und Futtermittell, [1974] 2 CMLR 540, May 29, 1974. The case grew out
of a challenge by a German exporter who sought to prove that a 1967 Council
regulation that made the grant of export licenses for certain agricultural products
conditional on the prior payment of a deposit which was to be forfeited if the
export was not made violated the principle of proportionality recognized in German
law.
109. In re application of Wunsche Handelsgesellschaft, [1987] 3 CMLR 225,
Oct. 22, 1986. In this case, a German importer challenged the denial of his permit
application to import mushrooms from Taiwan arguing that the license require-
ment was no longer needed since there was in fact a shortage of mushrooms in
the Community. The ECJ upheld the license requirement on referral from a Ger-
man administrative law court and the importer then looked to the GFCC.
110. Maastricht, supra note 14. Several claims were pressed before the GFCC,
however, the court held that only one of them, the guarantee of a right to vote
and participate in the legitimation of the organs of government and to influence
the implementation of state power, was admissible. It is this claim that is being
discussed in this note.
111. The Basic Law is the German Constitution.
112. Solange I, supra note 107, at para. 2. The court stated "this court adheres
to [the ECJ's] settled view that Community law is neither a component part of
the national legal system nor international law, but forms an independent system
of law flowing from an autonomous legal source." Id. However, the court went on
to say that the system of Community law and the national law are "two legal
spheres [that] stand independent of and side by side one another." Id. While stat-
ing that the ECJ could not rule with binding authority on whether a Community
law is compatible with the Constitution, and that the GFCC could not determine
whether secondary Community legislation coincided with the Treaties, the Court
said "this does not lead to any difficulties as long as the two systems do not come
into conflict with one another in their substance." Id.
113. Article 24 of the Basic Law deals with the transfer of sovereign rights
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stitutions of the EC lacked democratic legitimacy, the GFCC
must ensure that Community acts respect the fundamental
rights protections of the Basic Law."4 The Court discussed
the current state of European integration and decided that
since the Community lacked democratic legitimacy, 115 and
sufficient human rights protection," 6 it would allow suits
based on a claim that Community law violates a fundamental
rights principle guaranteed by German law."' In the twelve
years between Solange I and Solange II, the ECJ had read
fundamental rights protection into the Treaty"' so that with
its ruling in Solange II the GFCC was able to say that "there
are no decisive factors to lead one to conclude that the stan-
dard of fundamental rights which has been achieved under
Community law is not adequately consolidated.""' Therefore,
from the German federal government to supra-national institutions, such as the
EU. All of the Member States of the EU amended their constitutions in this way
as a means of incorporating community law into national law.
114. See Solange I, supra note 107, at paras. 3-4. More specifically, the court
stated "article 24 of the constitution limits the possibility of the Community insti-
tutions to make law directly in Germany in that it nullifies any amendment of the
Treaty which would destroy the identity of the valid constitution of the Federal
Republic of Germany by encroaching on the structures which make it go up." Id.
115. "The Community still lacks a democratically legitimated parliament direct-
ly elected by general suffrage which possesses legislative powers and to which the
Community organs empowered to legislate are fully responsible on a political lev-
el." Solange I, supra note 108, at para. 4.
116. [The Community still] lacks in particular a codified catalogue of fundamen-
tal rights, the substance of which is reliably and unambiguously fixed for the
future in the same way as the substance of the Constitution. Id.
117. Id.
As long as the integration process has not progressed so far that
Community law also receives a catalogue of fundamental rights decided
by a parliament and of settled validity, which is adequate in comparison
with the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the Constitution, a
reference by a court of the Federal Republic of Germany to the German
Federal Constitutional Court following the obtaining of a ruling of the
European Court under Article 177 of the Treaty, is admissible and nec-
essary if the German court regards the rule of Community law which is
relevant to its decision as inapplicable in the interpretation given by the
European Court, because and in so far as it conflicts with one of the
fundamental rights of the Constitution.
Id. at para. 7.
118. The German court stated "[all the main institutions of the Community
have since acknowledged in a legally sufficient manner that in the exercise of
their powers and in the pursuit of the objectives of the Community they will be
guided as a legal duty by respect for fundamental rights, in particular as estab-
lished by the constitutions of the Member States." Solange II, supra note 105, at
para. d.
119. Solange II, supra note 109 at para. d. The court specifically referred to
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the court concluded that "so long as" the institutions of the
Community generally ensure an effective protection of funda-
mental rights, and in so far as they generally safeguard the
content of fundamental rights, the GFCC will no longer exer-
cise its jurisdiction to review Community legislation by the
standard of the fundamental rights contained in the Basic
Law.2
0
C. The Maastricht Decision
With its decision in the Maastricht case, the GFCC resur-
rected the ability of a national court to determine the adequacy
of Community law as it relates to the fundamental rights pro-
tection of national constitutional law. While stating that this
case was not Solange III,121 the GFCC argued that the
Community's lack of democratic legitimacy creates problems
when the Community seeks to act on the fringes of its pow-
•er. 2 By requiring the EU to abide by its self-imposed limits
on power and attempting to ensure democratic legitimacy in
EU decision making, the GFCC has provided a model upon
which other national courts may build in order to protect fun-
damental rights and national identity in the face of
Europeanization.
In its Maastricht opinion, the GFCC held that Article 23(1)
of the Basic Law, which empowers parliament to transfer the
exercise of state responsibilities to a supra-national organiza-
tion, is subject to the Basic Law principle of democracy, which
prohibits dilution of the legitimacy of the exercise state power
through elections."' The democratically elected members of
the German parliament participate in maintaining Germany's
rights as a member of the European institutions and in formu-
the joint declaration issued by the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission on April 5, 1977, which stated that these institutions will respect
fundamental human rights and the European Human Rights Convention. See also
Grimm, supra note 105, at 233-34.
120. See Solange II, supra note 109, at para. f.
121. See Maastricht, supra note 14, at 406.
122. See Maastricht, supra note 14, at 426.
123. Under German law all governmental decisions must be made or approved
by officials democratically responsible to the German electorate. If the exercise of
governmental power is shifted away from those who are democratically responsible
to the electorate, than the principle of democracy has been violated and that exer-
cise of power is unconstitutional. Id at 409. See infra discussion at note 125 for
the process by which members of the EU legislative bodies are chosen.
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lating Germany's EU policy." Through this process, the Ger-
man citizen retains a role in choosing the government that
represents him and aids in formulating the policies that affect
him.' When the institutions of the EU act in such a way as
to either violate the principles established in the founding
treaties, 6 or expand their reach in a way not anticipated by
the Treaty, the GFCC must exercise its power and declare
that act unenforceable in Germany.
1. The German View of EU Power
The GFCC interpreted the TEU narrowly, concluding that
it confers specific powers and responsibilities on the basis of
limited, individual powers.'28 In an attack on the ECJ's use of
an implied powers doctrine, the court stated that EU institu-
tions may not "deduce the existence of a power based only on
the existence of a function."2 9 Likewise, the court read the
subsidiarity principle as a blanket restraint on Community ac-
124. Maastricht, supra note 14.
125. "[A]ny German citizen with the right to vote is guaranteed the subjective
right to participate in the election of the German Federal Parliament and thereby
to co-operate in the legitimation of State power by the people at a federal level
and to influence the implementation thereof." Id. The power to elect members of
parliament legitimizes Community acts in Germany since the members of the
European Commission, which is charged with proposing all legislation, are appoint-
ed by the national government from which they come. The Council of Ministers
consists of members of national governments that are charged with making law in
certain defined areas. For example the Minister of Transportation would be
Germany's representative in the Council when that body is discussing issues of
transportation policy. Finally the European Parliament ensures democratic legit-
imacy through the direct election of its members.
126. E.g., if the Community attempted to legislate in a way that would hinder
the functioning of the internal marker or lead to decreased integration among the
Member States.
127. By legislating the length of trucks to be used in transporting goods be-
tween the Member States, the length of the mud flaps that those trucks use, or
mandating that trains used in Community transport be of a certain length or
contain only a certain number of cars.
128. See Monaghan, supra note 87, at 1481-87. Note that the complainants in
the Maastricht case also argued that the TEU was unconstitutional since it did
not provide for ECJ review of Community acts pursuant to the common foreign
and security policy and the cooperation in justice and home affairs. The court
easily brushed this aside saying that those provisions of the Treaty do not allow
the Community to implement law in the Member States which is directly applica-
ble and which preempts other law. See also Maastricht, supra note 14, at 412-13.
129. Maastricht, supra note 14, at 426.
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tion." The court held that subsidiarity does not confer pow-
ers on the Community but rather places limitations on the
implementation of powers that already have been con-
ferred.' Therefore, subsidiarity is a condition that must be
met before a Community institution may act in an area in
which it has a clearly granted competence.'32
Weighing in on the debate concerning the legal nature of
the Community, the GFCC states that the term Union, as used
in the TEU, refers to "the Member States acting in concert, not
as an independent legal entity."33 Instead, the German court
believed that the EU is either an inter-governmental communi-
ty of states, an alliance of states, or a community of states." 4
If the EU is a community of states, it receives democratic legit-
imacy for its actions from the national governments of the
Member States.' If the community's exercise of sovereign
powers is based upon the democratic process of forming politi-
cal will and conveying that will to the community, those pow-
ers must be exercised by an institution responsible to the gov-
ernments of the Member States; which are themselves subject
to democratic control.'36 By deciding that Community law is
legitimized in this way, the GFCC points out the inherent
problems of any action derived from implied powers, or an EU
commerce clause, and positions itself to determine the compati-
bility of EU legislation with the democracy principle as en-
shrined in the Basic Law." 7
130. See Monaghan, supra note 89, at 1482-83.
131. See id. See also Maastricht, supra note 14, at 441-42.
132. See Monaghan, supra note 87, at 1483.
133. Id. at 1487.
134. See id.
135. Since the Parliaments of the Member States are all democratically elected,
their ultimate control over Community action provides the democratic legitimacy
that is a fundamental aspect of governance in Europe.
136. See Maastricht, supra note 14, at 421-22. "The Maastricht treaty estab-
lishes an inter-governmental community for the creation of an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe, which peoples are organized on a state level rather
than a state which is based upon the people of one state of Europe." Id.
137. While most of the Maastricht opinion is devoted to analyzing the role of
the three law-making institutions of the EU vis-a-vis Germany the same limits
will apply to ECJ decisions. While the GFCC has acknowledged the supremacy of
EU law and the ECJ's role in interpreting that law the court stated that the ECJ
does not have the authority to interpret the treaties in a way that would amount
to their amendment. See Grimm, supra note 105, at 236-38. Grimm goes on to say
that if the GFCC determines that the ECJ has amended the treaty through its
interpretation of a particular provision, that decision will not be binding within
[Vol. XKVI:41746
ATTORNEY GENERAL V. X
It seems that the GFCC would have the EU remain an
inter-governmental organization such that a Member State
simply could drop out if membership no longer suited its
needs, became politically unpopular at home, or simply became
too costly. However, this is not the version of the European
Union that presently exists after the completion of the internal
market and the formation of the European Monetary Un-
ion.'38 The presence of a monetary union suggests that politi-
cal union will follow."3 9 Therefore, for a country to choose to
opt out or withdraw from the EU may prove increasingly diffi-
cult once EMU membership has been achieved.' 40 In short,
the.nations of Europe simply have gone too far to turn back
and have, for better or worse, tied their fates together with the
principles of free trade and democratic cooperation.
V. PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE IRISH CASE
A. Background
Roman Catholicism has long been a part of Irish national
identity. Accordingly, the 1937 Irish Constitution contained a
formal allegiance with the Church.' As part of this commin-
gling of church and state, article 44.1.2 of the constitution
recognized "the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic
and Roman Church as the guardian of the faith professed by
the great majority of the citizens."4  In what may have been
a foreshadowing of future changes in Irish society, this portion
of the constitution was repealed in 1972, just one year before
Ireland joined the European Community.
In 1983, just ten years after entering the Community, and
perhaps as a result of fear of the long term effects of the other
Germany. Id.
138. See EC Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 2.
139. See Permanent Revolution, supra note 23.
140. For example, it would most likely be much more difficult for New York
State to opt out of a Mid-Atlantic regional trade agreement, than for it to secede
from the U.S.
141. The Irish Constitution was largely the work of one man, Eamon deValera.
DeValera had a vision of Ireland as a nation of rural, Catholic, farmers and
sought to imprint this belief on the basic structure of his newly independent na-
tion. See generally, Christine P. James, Cead Mile Failte? Ireland Welcomes Di-
vorce: The 1995 Divorce Referendum and the Family (Divorce) Act of 1996 8 DUKE
J. COMP. & INTL L. 175, 175-88 (1997).
142. Art. 41.1.2, Constitution of Ireland, 1937 (repealed 1972).
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Member States' more liberal abortion policies, article 40.3.3
(hereinafter the eighth amendment) which reads "The State
acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in
its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to
defend and vindicate that right,"4 3 was added to the consti-
tution. The Irish courts have interpreted that provision to
mean that abortions are not available in Ireland under any
circumstances. The courts also have said that the eighth
amendment does not allow Irish citizens, in Ireland, to be
counseled about abortion,' the availability of abortion in
other nations 45 (notably England), or to travel to receive an
abortion.'46
While in some respects the vision of Ireland as a nation of
rural Catholic farmers has survived, " in many other ways
this image has failed to keep pace with modern realities. One
way in which it has failed is the changing nature of the Irish
economy. In 1937, the Republic of Ireland was overwhelmingly
supported by an agrarian economy supplemented by small
industrial concerns. By 1995, Ireland had Europe's fastest
growing economy and its third best performing market.'49 Al-
though the Irish government began to shift the country's econ-
omy away from agriculture and toward industry, particularly
high-tech industry as early as the 1960's,' it was Ireland's
143. Art. 40.3.3, Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
144. See SPUC v. Grogan [1989] I.R. 753 (Ir. H.Ct.) affd in part, reu'd in part
[1989] I.R. 760 (Ir. S.C.).
145. See id.
146. See Attorney General v. X, supra note 1.
147. The Catholic Church still plays a large role in society, as evidenced by the
narrow margin that passed the divorce act in 1996 and the continued vitality of
the eighth amendments ban on abortion.
148. See generally, James, supra note 141; Jessica J. Poyner, Inuesting in Ire.
land: The Enticement of the U.S. High-Tech Industry to the Emerald Isle, 10
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 195, 196-97 (1997).
149. See Poyner, supra note 148, at 199-97.
150. The Irish Development Agency ("IDA"), which became an independent
government agency in 1969, is largely responsible for attracting foreign business
into Ireland. The IDA gave US$120 million in corporate tax breaks and spends
US$100 million annually in order to attract foreign firms (with one-half of that
amount going to US firms alone). Additionally, Ireland has relatively low-wages
and a well educated work-force (and one that receives an emphasis on technology
in the universities). The strength of the Irish Tiger appears unabated. Recently
Dell Computers and Intel have announced that they are expanding their presence
in Ireland with the construction of new assembly plants.
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accession into the European Community in 1973 that truly led
to the creation of the "Irish Tiger."151
Another way in which the early view of Ireland has failed
to withstand Europeanization is in the area of social policy.
While the imposition of EU law on Ireland's economy has cre-
ated a great success story, the attempted imposition of EU law
on Ireland's social policy has created unrest and dissatisfac-
tion.5
2
Regardless of the merits of the abortion debate, and the
rights of people to divorce, it should seem clear that the over-
lay of EU law, especially the free movement principles, have
altered the language and tenor of the debate. This note is not
attempting to take a position on the merits of the debate, but
rather argues that any changes in national law on such an
important issue should be made by national citizens and not
imposed on them from above by an organization that is not
democratically responsible to them.
B. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. X
In December 1991, Ms. X was raped and became preg-
nant.5 ' She was distraught over her plight and, together
with her parents, made the decision to travel to England to
receive an abortion."M During the course of the criminal in-
vestigation of the rape, Ms. X related to the police that she
would be traveling to England to end her pregnancy.' As
required by Irish law, this fact was reported and eventually
came to the attention of the Attorney General who sued for an
injunction in the Irish High Court in an effort to restrain Ms.
X from traveling abroad.156 Upon hearing of the issuance of
the injunction, Ms. X and her family returned to Ireland to
argue before the High Court which ruled against her."'
On appeal, the Irish Supreme Court reversed, holding that
151. See Poyner, supra note 148.
152. See David O'Connor, Limiting Public Morality Exceptions to Free Movement
in Europe: Ireland's Role in a Changing European Union, 22 BROOK. J. INTL. L.
695, 695-711 (1997).
153. Attorney General v. X, [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir. S.C.) (opinion of C.J. Finlay).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
20011 1749
BROOK. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XXVI:4
"the proper test to be applied is that if it is established as a
matter of probability that there is a real and substantial risk
to the life, as distinct from the health of the mother, which can
only be avoided by the termination of her pregnancy, that such
termination is permissible having regard to the true intention
of article 40.3.3 of the Constitution."158 In this case, Ms. X
had told her mother on several occasions that as a result of
becoming pregnant she wanted to kill herself and this, along
with psychiatric testimony that corroborated her intention, was
found to be sufficient to meet the Supreme Court's new
test.159
Ms. X's attorneys had also raised issues of European Law
in their defense; namely that the mother's right to travel, in-
cluding travel outside of Irish jurisdiction, was absolute and
could not be restricted by reference to the right to life of the
unborn child. 60 The Supreme Court chose to avoid those is-
sues by deciding the case on the basis of national law.161
However, since the European law issues were briefed and
argued before the Court, Chief Justice Finlay addressed them
in clearly identified obiter dicta. 6 '
C.J. Finlay argued that when there is a conflict between
158. Id.
159. Specifically X told her mother that upon learning that she was pregnant
she wanted to throw herself down a flight of stairs. On the return journey from
London X told her mother that while in London she had wanted to throw herself
in front of a train. X later told her parents that she was causing them so much
trouble that she would rather be dead than to continue as she was. As a result of
all this X's mother took her to a clinical psychiatrist who felt that X was capable
of suicide because she had concluded that it was the best solution to the situation
she was in. Attorney General v. X, [19921 1 I.R. 1, at paras. 6-7. (Ir. S.C.) (opin-
ion of C.J. Finlay).
160. X also raised alternative defenses that if her right to travel could be re-
stricted it could only be done by act of Parliament and not simply by court order.
An additional claim was made that travel to receive an abortion could not be
restricted since that service was legal in other countries. See id.
161. "The conclusions which I have reached and which are shared by a majori-
ty of my colleagues on this court as to the true test to be applied to the reconcili-
ation of the right to life of the unborn and the right to life of the mother identi-
fied and guaranteed under article 40.3.3 of the constitution and on the facts which
have been established by the appellants to satisfy that test, make it unnecessary
for the purpose of deiciding this appeal to reach any conclusion on these further
issues which were raised." See id. (opinion of Chief Justice Finlay).
162. "These issues having been fully argued and being matters of considerable
public interest, it seems to me that I should express my views upon them, even
though those views may fall, as a matter of law, within the category of being
obiter dicta." Id. (opinion of C.J. Finlay).
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rights that are fundamental, it becomes necessary to apply a
priority of rights, and that in this case the right to life would
trump the right to travel."a Addressing article 59 of the
TEU, and its guarantees of free movement, C.J. Finlay noted
that Member States are allowed to derogate from that princi-
ple on the basis of public policy, public security, or public
health."M At this point the court noted that since neither
they, nor the High Court below, had been asked to refer to the
ECJ, and since European law was unnecessary to resolve the
dispute before them, their opinion was final.'65
While the ratification of the Maastricht treaty, and public
referenda that accompanied it, have ensured that these same
facts no longer will present a problem to Europeanization,'66
the Irish Supreme Court's decision still may be instructive in
attempting to determine the outer limits of European power.
In their attempt to avoid issues of European Law,'67 and
ensure that national law controls national decision-making, the
Irish Supreme court and the German Federal Constitutional
Court have together provided a model for other EU Member
States that seek to protect themselves from European en-
croachment on social policy and democratic control.
163. Id. C.J. Finlay also rejected X's alternative argument that travel should
only be restricted by act of Parliament by looking to the historical power of the
Court to protect and defend human life.
164. See Id. See also EC Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 59.
165. "It is consistent with the jurisprudence of the Court that there being a
ground on which the case can be decided without reference to European law, but
under Irish law only, that method should be employed." Attorney General v. X,
[1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir. S.C.) (opinion of C.J. Finlay).
166. In a referendum held on November 25, 1992, Irish voters passed the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Irish Constitution. The Thirteenth
Amendment, which was passed by 62.3% of voters, grants Irish citizens the right
to travel to another EU Member State to receive an abortion. The Fourteenth
Amendment, which passed by 60%, allows Irish citizens to receive and furnish
information about abortion services available in other Member States, thereby
overruling the Irish Supreme Court's decision in Society for the Protection of Un-
born Children v. Grogan, [19891 IR 753, [1991] 3 CMLR 849. See Abigail-Mary
E.W. Sterling, The European Union and Abortion Tourism: Liberalizing Ireland's
Abortion Law, 20 B.C. INTL & COMP. L. REV. 385, 398-99 (1997). See also RAY-
mOND BYRNE & WmLIAM BiNtHY, ANNUAL REVIEW OF IRISH LAw 1992 206-7
(1994).
167. The Irish Courts were aided in this by the litigants failure to even ask
for a referral to the ECJ on the issues of European law that were presented.
However, since the process of asking for, and being granted, an article 177 refer-
ral is a matter of national law the Irish courts could still have refused and decid-
ed the case on the basis of national law.
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C. An Alternative Approach for National Courts that Wish to
Protect National Identity and Fundamental Rights
While the European Court of Justice has held explicitly
that national courts may not review community law to ensure
its correspondence with national constitutional law,168 the
German Constitutional court has done so.6 9 and the Irish Su-
preme Court has hinted that it might.7 0 Since the decision
whether to refer questions to the ECJ is a matter of national
law, it is for the national courts alone to decide when EU law
is instrumental to the resolution of a case before that court.
Therefore, a national court could ensure that fundamental
rights are protected by seeking to resolve cases on the basis of
national law and, thereby, consistent with the principle of
subsidiarity, that decisions are to be made as close to the peo-
ple as possible, enforce limits on European power.
Since the EU is a government of limited enumerated pow-
ers, national courts have a large role to play in enforcing those
limits. Limiting the reach of EU law, through a process of
fundamental rights protection in national courts, may serve as
a vehicle to create a different kind of European Union, one
that is more responsive to individual Europeans and less ag-
gressive in its strive toward integration. Whether the nations
of Europe actually want a kinder, gentler EU is a decision that
would then be made due to the express political will of Europe-
ans rather then being imposed on them without their knowl-
edge or consent.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to argue that any changes in
national law, as related to the fundamental rights of national
citizens should be made by an institution that is democratical-
ly responsible to them and not imposed from above by a supra-
national organization such as the European Union. Through a
discussion of the EU's organizational structure, and the meth-
od by which disputes as to the meaning of European law are
resolved, this Note has shown that the EU's law making insti-
168. See van Gend en Loos, supra note 27.
169. See Solange I, supra note 108; and Maastricht, supra note 14.
170. See SPUC v. Grogan, supra note 143; Attorney General v. X, [1992] 1 I.R.
1 (Ir. S.C.) (opinion of C.J. Finlay).
[Vol. XUVI:4
ATTORNEY GENERAL V. X
tutions are too far removed from the average citizen to alter,
consonant with democratic and subsidiarity principles, the way
that Europeans relate to one another.
While there are several avenues by which the EU can
become more responsible to the citizens of the Member States,
this Note has focused on the mechanism of national court chal-
lenges to EU law. In both the German and Irish cases, the
national courts expressed a willingness to examine EU law
within a framework of fundamental rights and guarantees
established by the national constitution. This willingness to re-
examine EU law in a national constitutional context could, if
exported, lead to a more disciplined and democratically driven
understanding of EU law.
Patrick Fitzmaurice"
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